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depends both on the proposals of the parties and on the unobserved idiosyncratic
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members of each party prefer the proposal of the party to which they belong to, rather
than the proposal of the other party. We prove the existence of such an equilibrium
and study its qualitative properties. For the cases in which parties use either the aver-
age or the median to aggregate the preferences of their members, we show that if
the unobserved idiosyncratic characteristics of the parties are similar, then parties
make different proposals in the stable equilibria. Conversely, we argue that if parties
differ substantially in their unobserved idiosyncratic characteristics, then the unique
equilibrium is convergent.
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1 Introduction
The issue of party platform formation has been a subject of substantial attention in
political economy. The major idea in this literature is that platforms of political parties
are formed in response to preferences of their members, whereas the memberships
themselves are, at least in part, determined by the platforms. Thus, in equilibrium
the party platforms should respond to the preferences of the members attracted by
them. An early paper putting forward an equilibrium concept in which party ideology
and its membership are endogenously determined was Baron (1993). His equilibrium
concept was related to the one used in the ‘voting with one’s feet’ models developed
in the study of local public goods (see Caplin and Nalebuff (1997) for an abstract
framework that covers both the political economy and public finance applications).
In related work, Aldrich (1983a, b), Gerber and Ortuño-Ortín (1998), and Poutvaara
(2003) have considered the interrelationship between partisan policy platforms and
political activism.
Amajor objective in this literature has been establishing conditions for existence of
divergent equilibria, in which parties propose different policies and attract members
with different policy preferences. In a deterministicmodel of this type (such asOrtuño-
Ortín and Roemer 1998 or Gomberg et al. 2004) such an equilibrium, if it exists,
involves a full sorting of agents in terms of their preferences over the policy space:
evenminute policy differences between parties induce a unique party choice by almost
all citizens (in the party activist literature, along the lines of Aldrich (1983a), where
there is a third possibility—that of non-participation—it is still normally assumed
that those actually actively taking part in partisan activities do it in the ideologically
closest party). However, such perfect sorting is not commonly observed in reality: even
ideologically identical peoplemay frequently find themselves in different parties based
on idiosyncratic non-policy considerations (perhaps, historical esthetical or personal).
These non-policy issues might not even be observable by an outsider, making the
observed policy preferences only stochastic predictors of individual party choice.
This is, of course, not a new idea in political science, where the study of stochastic
models of voting has been widespread for a long time (see Coughlin (1992) for a
survey). Our stochastic preference model of endogenous membership follows the
same intuition. Our focus is, however, somewhat different. In particular, rather than
considering the vote-maximizing parties in an electoral contextwe restrict our attention
to parties aggregating members’ preferences and try to establish to which extent the
results of an older deterministic models (such as our own Gomberg et al. (2004))
may be extended to this new setting. In modeling parties as aggregating preferences
of their members, while membership is, in turn, determined in part (but not fully)
by party policy positions our paper is related to the work by Roemer (2001). Our
approach, however, is different in such crucial aspects as, among others, our more
explicit modeling of membership decisions, and the nature of intra-party decision
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rules (which in Roemer’s case discriminate among members of different ideologies
based on belonging to a ‘partisan core’).
The approach incorporating the stochastic party preference has, indeed, been one
of those proposed already by Caplin and Nalebuff (1997). They, however, found it
unsatisfactory, since, in their opinion, such equilibria could, in many cases, be fully
determined by the stochastic preference component and not by the observables. Fur-
thermore, they believed, it could not guarantee existence of equilibria exhibiting policy
divergence. For, as they note, ‘there is the possibility that as the noise approaches zero,
two institutions’ positions will approach each other.’ They further conjectured that
‘whenever there is the nonexistence of an equilibrium without probabilistic choice
it must be the case that the group positions approach each other in the probabilistic
choice model as the noise goes to zero.’ Remarkably, as we show in this paper, the
converse is also true: whenever conditions for existence of divergent equilibria in a
‘non-stochastic’ model, such as those in Caplin and Nalebuff (1997) and Gomberg
et al. (2004) hold, such equilibria will also exist if we introduce a stochastic component
in individual preferences, as long as the latter is sufficiently small. This, of course,
implies that, contrary to what Caplin and Nalebuff (1997) conjectured, noise is not
going to fully determine the equilibrium policy positions of parties.
A seemingly major difficulty in this extension is that the previous studies obtained
existence of sorting equilibria from the properties of the space of perfectly sorting par-
titions of the population between parties (seeCaplin andNalebuff (1997) andGomberg
et al. (2004); in the context of local public goods, this approach goes back to Westhoff
(2005)). In the absence of perfect sorting, this approach is, of course, not feasible.
However, the crucial feature of the deterministic model is, in fact, not the sorting per
se, but a certain ‘instability’ of the convergent equilibrium. To see that, suppose there
are two parties which propose the same policy. Then, the entire population is indiffer-
ent and the vote splits in such a way that a convergent equilibrium obtains. We require
now that even minor policy perturbations result in full population sorting and sharply
divergent policies. It turns out that, if that is the case, the existence of (at least one)
sorting equilibrium is, in fact, guaranteed. In this paper, we show that this intuition,
in part, extends to the stochastic context: if the convergent (or ‘almost’ convergent)
equilibrium exists but is unstable to small policy perturbations, it may be used to detect
existence of divergent equilibria. In fact, as the addition of the stochastic component
adds continuity to the model, in a sense the results become more transparent in this
setting. In particular, in a context of a “generalized example” in our framework, we
show that when parties are perceived by voters to be very similar in non-policy terms,
so that the observed randomness of individual partisan choice is relatively small, the
results of the deterministic model extend to the stochastic case.
For the moment (and for simplicity) we abstract from possible strategic electoral
competition by parties (in the terminology of Caplin and Nalebuff (1997) our parties
are “membership-based”). Themain reason here ismethodological: we believe that the
issue of endogenizing party membership is distinct from the issue of strategic behavior
by party leaders in a democratic election. Our main concern here is the former, and we
want to consider it separately. This assumptionmay be viewed as appropriate for either
amodel of parties in a settingwithout commitment (e.g.,when voterswould not believe
a party, once in office, can implement policies not supported by its membership) or
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in a setting without true electoral competition (e.g., if parties’ share of the office is
determined throughnon-electoralmeans).Of course,wedo intend to explore extending
our results to cover the case of possible strategic interactions between parties.
We assume that a political party is characterized by a policy position and by some
exogenously fixed idiosyncratic non-policy position or characteristic. The policy posi-
tion will be endogenously determined by the membership of the party. Thus, parties
are represented by positions in a multi-dimensional space with a fixed position in one
dimension (the non-policy dimension) and a variable position in the other dimensions.
Krasa and Polborn (2010) and Krasa and Polborn (2012) study equilibrium in a multi-
dimensional model in which each candidate is exogenously fixed on some dimension.
Unlike in our case, their candidates are office-motivated and their equilibrium concept
is quite different from the one we consider here (in our case parties are ideological
and the ideology is endogenously determined). Dziubin´ski and Roy (2011) consider a
model of electoral competition in a two-dimensional policy space where the position
in one of the dimensions is fixed. They analyze existence of convergent and divergent
Nash equilibria. A difference between the models is that their parties are Downsian
(non-ideological, but concerned with election), whereas our main goal is to analyze
the endogenous formation of party ideologies.1
Our model generates interesting predictions on the relation between the policy pro-
posals of parties and their idiosyncratic non-policy characteristics. It is often claimed
that when ideological parties strongly differ in non-policy characteristics (that are
exogenously given) they have more incentives to propose divergent policies (see Roe-
mer 2011). This is due to the fact that proposing amore ‘radical’ policy is not that costly
for a party, since voters’ decisions are very much influenced by the large differences
in the non-policy variable. In our model, however, this does not need to be the case.
If agents’ preferences over the policy variables are independent of their preferences
over the non-policy characteristic of the parties, increasing the differences between
those non-policy characteristics might yield convergence of the policy proposals2.
The intuition is clear: If parties are very different in their non-policy characteristics,
their membership is basically determined by such non-policy characteristic. Hence,
1 As already mentioned, our theoretical model makes the following two assumptions: that the policy
proposed by each political party can be seen as an aggregation of the policy preferences of its members,
and that party membership is determined by both policy and non-policy characteristics of parties. In an
appendix to the unpublished working paper version of the paper (see Gomberg et al. 2013), we provide
some empirical evidence, suggesting that these might be realistic assumptions. In particular, we first analyze
the political platforms of the main parties and the average ideal policy of their supporters. We find that, in
countries with only twomajor parties, such as US and UK, the political platform of the party and the average
ideal policy of its supporters are strikingly similar. This is not the case in other countries with more than
two major parties or in a clearly unstable political period. In the same appendix, we also analyze data about
the self-reported ideological position of citizens and which party they vote for. As expected, the ideological
position is not sufficient to perfectly determine the voting behavior of citizens (some left-wing citizens vote
for the right-wing party, and some right-wing citizens vote for the left-wing party). Moreover, we show that
such data seem consistent with the existence of a non-policy variable such that agents’ preferences over it
are independent of their preferences on the left–right ideological space.
2 The authors in Dziubin´ski and Roy (2011) provide a somehow related result. In their case, if parties
strongly differ in their fixed policies in a given dimension, there is full convergence in the other dimension.
In our case, in general there is no full convergence and the explanation and logic behind our result is very
different from theirs.
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unless preferences in the policy and non-policy dimensions are correlated (in which
case sorting in the non-policy dimension would by itself impose policy divergence),
members of the two parties will be quite similar regarding their preferences on the
policy variables. And, since parties just aggregate the preferences of their members,
their policy proposals will be very similar.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model and
develops a general existence result. Sections 3 and4present the results for, respectively,
the mean and median voter rules in a single dimension of policy space, and Sect. 5
concludes.
2 Model
There are two parties. Party j = 1, 2 proposes a policy vector x j ∈ X , where X is a
non-empty compact and convex subset of Rn with non-empty interior. In addition to
a policy x j , party j = 1, 2 is characterized by a non-policy variable y j ∈ Y . The set
Y is assumed to be a closed interval of R. It may be interpreted as reflecting currently
fixed or intrinsic characteristics that matter for individual preferences. We shall make
the following assumption.3
Assumption 1 y1 < y2.
There is a continuum of agent types with preferences over both policy and non-
policy characteristics of parties. Specifically, each agent of type (α, β) ∈ A × B ⊂
R
n × R has Euclidean preferences represented by the utility function
u(x, y;α, β) = −||(x, y) − (α, β)||
where x ∈ X is the policy platform adopted by the party and y ∈ Y is the intrinsic
characteristic of the party. For simplicity, we shall take A = X and Y = B. Thus, for
fixed y ∈ Y , an agent of type (α, β) may be identified with his/her ideal policy.
There is a measure space of agents (citizens) (A × B,A × B, η), where A is the
Borel σ -algebra on A, B is the Borel σ -algebra on B and η is a measure on A × B
such that η(A × B) = 1. We denote the distribution function of η as F(α, β).
Assumption 2 Themeasureη is represented by a continuous density function f (α, β),
which is equivalent to Lebesgue measure.
Citizens play a twofold role. Each agent is a voter and a member of the party.4
Given the parties policy and the intrinsic characteristics (x1, y1) and (x2, y2), citizens
join the party they like the most. Thus, the individual party choice is unambiguous.
However, from the point of view of the parties, the second coordinate of individual type
(α, β) is unobservable. Hence, for the parties the observable individual preferences
3 The case y1 = y2 being the one we considered in Gomberg et al. (2004).
4 In most real cases, only a small fraction of the population is a member of a party. Our results remain
true if we assume that the set of citizens who become members of parties is a random sample of the whole
population.
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over policies (given by α) may serve only as an imperfect predictor of individual party
choice. From the perspective of the party, the citizen’s decision which party to join
appears stochastic.
A partymembership is observed as a finitemeasure on A.We shall restrict ourselves
to measures on A which induce a continuous population density g (α) defined on
A. In the following, we will consider only non-null subsets of X . For the sake of
concreteness and ignoring zero-measure sets, we will identify the set of possible party
memberships with the set Σ consisting of all continuous functions g : A → R++
such that 0 <
∫
A g(α) dα < 1. On Σ we consider the topology determined by the
supremum norm ‖g‖ = sup{|g(α)| : α ∈ A} for g ∈ Σ . Our results would not change
if one considers the L1 topology on Σ .
A political party j = 1, 2 chooses its policy by aggregating the observed policy
preferences of its members, according to some fixed rule Pj : Σ → X , defined for
non-null subsets of X . As parties do not observe β, the aggregation applies only to α.
We shall denote the profile of party policy-setting rules as P = (P1, P2). Therefore,
our model is determined by M = (A, B, f, y1, y2, P1, P2).
Example 3 As an example of such a rule, we may consider the mean (respectively,
the median voter rule, defined only for n = 1) which assigns to each party the ideal
policy of its mean voter (respectively, median voter). These two aggregation rules are
studied in Sects. 3 and 4 below. In particular, the mean voter rule Pμ assigns to each
admissible population partition ν = (ν1, ν2) ∈ Σ × Σ its mean,
Pμi (ν) =
1
νi (A)
∫
A
α dνi (α), i = 1, 2.
Consider now the exogenous idiosyncratic party characteristic parameters y1 and
y2. For each party i = 1, 2 a policy proposal profile x = (x1, x2) ∈ X × X induces a
party membership defined by
Ai (x) = {(α, β) ∈ A × B : u(xi , yi ;α, β) ≥ u(x j , y j ;α, β), j = i}
Since we only consider population densities which are absolutely continuous with
respect to Lebesgue measure, the line segment A1(x) ∩ A2(x) has measure zero.
Ignoring this zero-measure set, we will think of A1(x) and A2(x) as a partition of
A × B.
We define next the mapping σ = (σ1, σ2) : X × X → Σ × Σ . Given a proposal
x = (x1, x2), the induced party memberships A1(x) and A2(x) determine measures
σ1(x), σ2(x) ∈ Σ whose associated density functions are
gi (α; x) =
∫
{β∈B:(α,β)∈Ai (x)}
f (α, β)dβ, i = 1, 2 (1)
That is, for each Lebesgue measurable set S ⊂ A, its measure induced by x is
σi (x)(S) =
∫
S
gi (α; x) dα
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And we define σ(x) = (σ1(x), σ2(x)). For n = 1, we can provide a more explicit
formulation of the densities g1(α; x), g2(α; x). Let x = (x1, x2) ∈ X × X . Agents
affiliate to one or the other party, depending on which side of the line
z(t; x) = x1 − x2
y2 − y1 t +
y1 + y2
2
− x
2
1 − x22
2(y2 − y1) (2)
they lie. That is,
g1(α; x) =
∫ z(α;x)
−∞
f (α, β) dβ, g2(α; x) =
∫ +∞
z(α;x)
f (α, β) dβ (3)
We remark that, even though,
∫
A
(g1(α, x) + g2(α, x)) dα = 1
the measures σ1(x) and σ2(x) do not necessarily have disjoint supports. That is, the
product g1(α, x)g2(α, x) does not necessarily vanish. Thus, the observable charac-
teristic α ∈ A does not completely describe the behavior of the voters. Even though
agents are fully rational, their behavior is stochastic from the point of view of the
parties.
Definition 4 A population partition ν = (ν1, ν2) shall be considered admissible if
ν1, ν2 ∈ Σ and for every S ∈ A, we have that ν1(S) + ν2(S) = η(S × B).
The following lemma shows that the mapping σ : X×X → Σ ×Σ is well defined.
That is, the functions g1(α; x) and g2(α; x) are continuous on the variable α ∈ A.
The proof is provided in the “Appendix”.
Lemma 5 Suppose Assumptions 1, and 2 hold. Then, the mapping σi : X × X → Σ
is continuous for each i = 1, 2.
Remark 1 Note that, if y1 = y2 and, for example, x1 < x2, the induced population
densities are
g1(α; x) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
∫
B f (α, β)dβ if α <
x1+x2
2
1
2
∫
B f (α, β)dβ if α = x1+x22
0 if α > x1+x22
g2(α; x) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
∫
B f (α, β) dβ if α >
x1+x2
2
1
2
∫
B f (α, β) dβ if α = x1+x22
0 if α < x1+x22
Hence, the measures σ1(x) and σ2(x) do have disjoint supports. In particular, there
is full sorting of the parties’ members into two disjoint sets and we recover the ‘non-
stochastic’ framework posed by Caplin and Nalebuff (1997).
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2.1 Equilibrium
Our notion of equilibrium assumes free mobility of the electorate across parties. Thus,
our equilibrium concept requires that: (i) the proposals of the parties are determined
by their respective membership and (ii) given the party’s proposal, all the members of
each party prefer their own party to the alternative.
Definition 6 Given the profile of party policy-setting rules P and the idiosyncratic
party characteristics y1, y2, we say that (x∗, ν∗) ∈ X × X × Σ2 is a multi-party
equilibrium if:
1. x∗ = P(ν∗)
2. ν∗ = σ(x∗)
Furthermore, the equilibrium is divergent if x∗1 = x∗2 . Otherwise, we say that the
equilibrium is convergent.
The above definition captures the idea that, in equilibrium, the platforms of the
parties are consistent with the preferences of the members they attract. Consider the
mapping φ : X × X → X × X defined by φ(x) = P(σ (x)). Clearly, an equilibrium
is just a fixed point of this mapping.
Assumption 7 (continuity) The function Pj : (Σ, ‖ ‖) → X is continuous for j =
1, 2.
Proposition 8 SupposeAssumptions 1, 2 and7hold. Then, there exists an equilibrium.
Proof Consider the mapping φ : X × X → X × X defined by φ(x) = P(σ (x)). The
fixed points of this mapping correspond to equilibria of the model. The mapping is
clearly defined on the entire space X × X and continuity follows from Assumption 7
and Lemma 5. As X × X is compact and convex, by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem
there must exist at least one (possibly convergent) equilibrium.
Note that if y1 = y2, so that individual membership is fully determined by policy
positions, this model becomes deterministic and fully falls into the framework posed
by Caplin and Nalebuff (1997). Therefore, Proposition 8 shows that, as long as what
we are interested in is merely existence of multi-party equilibria, the present model
still fits the approach of Caplin and Nalebuff (1997) and Gomberg et al. (2004): basic
continuity and minimal internal support assumptions on the policy-setting rules (as
in Gomberg et al. (2004)), together with the exogenously imposed difference between
parties yield existence of equilibrium. The novel case for us in this paper is y1 = y2.
Since we are assuming that y1 < y2, we trivially obtain full sorting of the agents
in the A × B space. However, this sorting may be entirely caused by the difference in
the B dimension. In particular, if the observed policy positions of the parties (that is,
their projections onto the A component) coincide, then this equilibrium would still be
convergent. Hence, Proposition 8 is silent on the existence of divergent equilibria.
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Remark 2 Under Assumption 1, note that if x1 = x2 , then we have that
g1(α; x) = g1(α) =
∫ y1+y2
2
−∞
f (α, β)dβ
g2(α; x) = g2(α) =
∫ +∞
y1+y2
2
f (α, β)dβ (4)
does not depend on the specific value of x1 = x2. Hence, the quantities
λi = σi (x)(A) =
∫
A
gi (α; x) dα (5)
do no depend either on the particular value of x1 = x2.
We remark next that there is at most a unique convergent equilibrium. Of course,
the following result does not exclude the existence of other divergent equilibria.
Proposition 9 Suppose Assumptions 1, 2 and 7 hold. Then, the number of convergent
equilibria is at most 1.
Proof Consider a policy profile x = (x1, x1). Then, the partymembership is described
by the densities in (4), which is independent of x1 ∈ [0, 1]. That is, P ◦σ is constant in
the diagonal of A× A. It follows that there exists, at most, one convergent equilibrium.
Definition 10 Parties are ex ante identical if they use the same aggregating rule,
P = P1 = P2, and P (σ1(x)) = P (σ2(x)) whenever x = (x1, x2) is such that
x1 = x2.
Trivially, if parties are ex ante identical there is a convergent equilibrium. The
existence of such equilibrium relies on us being able to support identical policies in
equilibrium. Note that even if parties use the same internal policy-setting rule P1 =
P2 = P , this does not imply the existence of a convergent equilibrium. If the induced
distributions σ1 and σ2 are different, it might happen that P (σ1(x)) = P (σ2(x)), for
a proposal x with x1 = x2. Consider the following simple example.
Example 11 Let n = 1 and suppose the population is distributed over [0, 1] × [0, 1].
Suppose that both parties use the mean voter rule Pμ so that
Pμi (ν) =
1
νi (A)
∫
A
α dνi (α)
Consider two possible population distributions over this domain: the uniform distri-
bution over the whole of [0, 1] × [0, 1], so that individual preferences over the two
dimensions are entirely uncorrelated, and the uniform distribution over the diagonal
{(α, α) : α ∈ [0, 1]}, in which there is perfect correlation between the individual ideal
points in the two dimensions. Note that in both cases the unconditional distribution of
ideal points in the policy space is uniform: f1 (α) = 1. Assume, for simplicity, that
y2 = 1 − y1.
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Consider the case y1 = y2 = 12 . As the citizen preference in this case depends
only on f1 (α), for either of the two distributions there are the same three equilibria:
x1 = x2 = 1/2; x1 = 14 x2 = 34 ; and x1 = 34 x2 = 14 .5 As we increase the
difference between the idiosyncratic positions y1 and y2, the two cases will become
increasingly different. As we show in Section 4, when the individual preferences in the
two dimensions are uncorrelated x1 = x2 = 12 remains an equilibrium always, while
the other two equilibria converge to it, so that the symmetric equilibrium becomes the
only one as long as y1 ≤ 14 .
In contrast, in the case when preferences in the two dimensions are perfectly cor-
related, as long as y1 > 14 it is the divergent equilibria x1 = 14 x2 = 34 and x1 = 34
x2 = 14 that remain unchanged, while the convergent equilibrium disappears and grad-
ually shifts to x1 = y2, x2 = y1. When y1 ≤ 14 so that the parties are far apart, the
only surviving equilibrium in this case is x1 = 14 x2 = 34 . The population partition is
now fully determined by the party difference in the y dimension.
In a deterministic version of the model, Caplin and Nalebuff (1997) have postulated
the assumption that the party policy ruleswouldnever result in identical policies if party
populations have opposing preference, in the sense of being divided by a hyperplane
in the ideological space. Even in their model this assumption is problematic, unless
the policy rules are just aggregating intra-party preferences (“membership-based” in
their terminology). And since, in the present model, the sorting is not perfect, it is
entirely inapplicable here.
That introducing ex ante difference between parties may effectively impose pol-
icy divergence exogenously has been a particular concern in earlier work of Caplin
and Nalebuff (1997), who found a similar approach to be unsatisfactory for this very
reason. However, we will argue that in our model policy divergence obtains even if
parties are ex ante identical. The main concern in Sects. 3 and 4 below is to estab-
lish conditions for existence of divergent equilibria and determine their stability and
robustness properties.
3 Mean voter rule
In this section, we focus on the case in which parties aggregate the preferences of
their members using the mean voter rule. We will show that, even if parties are ex ante
identical, there is a divergent equilibrium, at least as long as the difference |y2 − y1| is
sufficiently small.Our approach allowsus to compute explicit bounds on the exogenous
interparty difference |y2 − y1|, which guarantees policy divergence. For simplicity, in
computing these bounds, we assume a unidimensional policy space n = 1.
5 Note that the convergent equilibrium in this example relies on full indifference of every agent between
the two parties, requiring a slight modification of the definitions along the lines of Gomberg et al. (2004).
In the uncorrelated case, this equilibrium is properly defined for any y1 <
1
2 . In the correlated case, we
rely on complete population indifference in the centrist equilibrium even if y1 <
1
2 . However, as long as
the correlation is imperfect, so that the population distribution is not concentrated on the hyperplane, this
would no longer be the case, while, as we show below, the structure of equilibrium set remains the same.
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3.1 Existence of divergent equilibria for ex ante identical parties
The mean voter rule, Pμ, assigns to each admissible population partition ν =
(ν1, ν2) ∈ Σ × Σ its mean,
Pμi (ν) =
1
νi (A)
∫
A
α dνi (α)
For x ∈ X×X , the induced population partition σ j (x) is represented by the density
g j (α; x) defined in (1). Hence, given the standing proposals x = (x1, x2) ∈ X × X
of the parties, each induced membership of the parties chooses
Pμj (σ (x)) =
∫
A αg j (α; x) dα∫
A g j (α; x)dα
=
∫
A αg j (α; x) dα
σ j (x)(A)
The following Lemma, which is proved in the “Appendix”, states that the mean voter
rule satisfies Assumption 7.
Lemma 12 The map φ : X × X → X × X, defined by φ(x) = Pμ(σ (x)), is
continuous and differentiable.
Recall that an equilibrium is a fixed point of the mapping φ : X × X → X × X
defined by φ(x) = (Pμ1 (σ (x)), Pμ2 (σ (x))). Therefore, (x∗1 , x∗2 ) is an equilibrium if
x∗j =
∫
A αg j (α; x∗) dα∫
A g j (α; x∗)dα
j = 1, 2
Given a distribution of the population f :A×B → R, letμ j = Pμj
(
σ j (x)
)
, j = 1, 2
be the means of the parties when parties make the same proposal x = (x1, x2) with
x1 = x2. Recall that even if parties make the same proposal, we cannot guarantee
that Pμ1 (σ1(x)) = Pμ2 (σ2(x)). So, in general, we do not expect that there will be a
convergent equilibrium.
On the other hand, if parties are ex ante identical and make the same proposal
x = (x1, x2), with x1 = x2, then Pμ1 (σ1(x)) = Pμ2 (σ2(x)) = μ, the observed mean
of the overall population on A. Therefore, (μ,μ) is a convergent equilibrium. We are
interested in finding conditions under which, even when parties are ex ante identical,
there are other divergent equilibria.
To do so, assume that μ1 = μ2 = μ. So, (μ,μ) is a convergent equilibrium.
We will prove that, provided that y1 and y2 are close enough, then the convergent
equilibrium (μ,μ) is unstable. The stability of (μ,μ) along the diagonal is immediate,
since the function φ trivially maps the diagonal into (μ,μ). To prove the existence of
other divergent equilibria, we will determine conditions under which the fixed point
(μ,μ) is unstable off-diagonal of X × X . By the Lefschetz’s fixed point theorem (see
Guillemin and Pollack 2010, pp. 119–130), the total sum of the indices of the fixed
points must be equal to 1 (the Euler characteristic of X × X ). Recall that the index of
a non-degenerate fixed point may be calculated as (−1)d , where d is the dimension
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of the unstable manifold of the fixed point. As the co-dimension of the diagonal is 1,
the index of the diagonal fixed point equals (−1)n , which implies it cannot be unique
if n = 1.
Hence, a divergent equilibrium will exist if we can prove that the convergent equi-
librium (μ,μ) is unstable off the diagonal. That is, it will be enough to show that the
eigenvalues of the matrix
B(x1, x2) =
( ∂φ1
∂x1
− 1 ∂φ1
∂x2
∂φ2
∂x1
∂φ2
∂x2
− 1
)
(6)
have different signs around (μ,μ). Hence, we only need to show that
lim
x→(μ,μ) det(B(x)) < 0 (7)
As stated in the next result, it turns out that if |y2 − y1| is small enough, the above
condition can be assured. Therefore, Proposition 13 below shows that if |y2 − y1| is
small enough, then either there is no convergent equilibrium (because μ1 = μ2) or
else (whenμ1 = μ2) the unique convergent equilibrium is unstable. That is, if |y2−y1|
is small enough, the stable equilibria must be divergent. Let λ1, λ2 be defined by (5).
Proposition 13 Let n = 1. Suppose that parties use the mean voter rule and that
μ1 = μ2 = μ. If
|y2 − y1| < 1
λ1λ2
∫
A
(α − μ)2 f
(
α,
y1 + y2
2
)
dα (8)
then there exists a divergent equilibrium.
The proof is provided in the “Appendix”. In there, we establish that det (B(x)) < 0.
The bound established by Proposition 13 depends only on two bits of population statis-
tics: the variance of ideal points in the observable ideological space of those citizens
who would be indifferent between parties in the absence of ideological differences
between them, and the relative size λ1 of the part of the population that exogenously
prefers one party to another when there is no ideological difference between them.
The following is an immediate result of Proposition 13.
Corollary 14 Let n = 1. Suppose that the parties are ex ante identical, use the mean
voter rule and the bound in (8) holds. Then, there exists a divergent equilibrium.
Example 15 Let n = 1 and the population distribution be uniform on [0, 1] × [0, 1]
so that f (α, β) = 1. Suppose that both parties use the mean voter rule Pμ and the
idiosyncratic variables are such that 0 < |y2 − y1| < 1/(12λ1(1 − λ1)) = 1/3. By
our proposition, there exists a divergent equilibrium. As an example satisfying this
inequality take y1 = 0.55 and y2 = 0.20. It is not difficult to show that the unique
divergent equilibrium with x1 < x2 has x1 = 0.416, x2 = 0.651. Of course, there is
an additional symmetric equilibrium with x1 = 0.651 > x2 = 0.416. See Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1 The divergent equilibrium with x1 < x2
On the other hand, while, strictly speaking, exceeding the bound does not guarantee
the uniqueness of the convergent equilibrium, examples of the latter are not hard to
find.
Proposition 13 shows that there is continuity between the deterministic and non-
deterministic models: a small amount of uncertainty about individual membership
decision does not affect the existence of a divergent equilibrium. Indeed, the Propo-
sition implies that exogenous differences between the parties imply that the citizens’
membership decision is mostly determined by the observed policy differences. In par-
ticular, if we let y2 = y1 and x1 = x2, we are reduced to the deterministic model.
Hence, the above result shows that the deterministic case is not isolated.
We now address some robustness questions of our model. Proposition 16 below
shows that as |y1 − y2| gets smaller and we approximate the deterministic case, there
will remain a properly divergent equilibrium, in which party positions will stay away
of each other. The proof is provided in the “Appendix”.
Let ys1 = 12 (y1 + y2 + s (y1 − y2)) and ys2 = 12 (y1 + y2 + s (y2 − y1)). This
allows us to define, for each s ∈ (0, 1) the mapping zs(t; x) defined by (2), the
corresponding induced measures σ s and the mapping φs = P ◦ σ s . As before, for
each s the fixed points of φs (x) will be equilibria of the corresponding model Ms =
(A, B, f, ys1, y
s
2, P
μ
1 , P
μ
2 ).
Proposition 16 Assume n = 1 and suppose that the parties are ex ante identical and
use the mean voter rule. Let y1, y2 and f satisfy the bound in (8). Then, for each
s ∈ (0, 1) there is a fixed point x¯ s of φs (x) such that the family {x¯ s}s∈(0,1) does not
converge to the diagonal in X × X, as s → 0.
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3.2 Other ‘mean’-type rules
It should be noted that the continuity result of Proposition 13 can be extended to policy
rules other than the mean voter rule, though the precise bound would be, of course,
different. In particular, suppose that, instead of choosing the ideal point of the mean
of its voter distribution, parties propose policies according to a different rule
Phj (η)) =
∫
A h(α)dη
η(A)
where h : A → A is a non-constant continuous mapping.
To fix ideas, suppose the parties are ex ante identical. Let x1 = x2, so g(α) =
g1(α; x) = g2(α; x) does not depend on x = (x1, x2). Denote the policy society as a
whole would adopt as χ = ∫A h(α)g(α) dα ∈ int(A). Following the steps of the proof
of Proposition 13, one may easily obtain that the following bound on the exogenous
difference between parties guarantees the existence of divergent equilibria:
0 < |y2 − y1| < 1
λ1λ2
∫
A
(h(α) − χ)(α − χ) f
(
α,
y1 + y2
2
)
dα
where λ1, λ2 are defined by (5). This implies that, for these rules, and as long as∫
A(h(α) − χ)(α − χ) f
(
α,
y1+y2
2
)
dα > 0, sufficiently small uncertainty about
individual membership choices leads to the existence of divergent equilibria.
3.3 Policy convergence and non-ideological characteristics for the mean voter
rule
In this section, we provide robust numerical and theoretical examples showing a type
of converse result for Proposition 13, as |y2 − y1| gets large. That is, if parties which
aggregate preferences via the mean voter rule are very different in their non-policy
characteristics, then their policy proposals will turn out to be very similar. Let f0 :
A×[−∞,∞] → R+ be a nonvanishing, continuous, bounded function with bounded
integral K = ∫A×[−∞,∞] f0 > 0.
Proposition 17 Let B = [−b, b] and yu1 = −u/2, yu2 = u/2. Consider the con-
ditional density fb induced6 by f0 on A × B. Assume parties use the mean voter
rule. There is b¯ > 0 such that if b > b¯ and b¯ ≤ u ≤ b then, the model
(A, B, fb, yu1 , y
u
2 , P
μ
1 , P
μ
2 ) has a unique equilibrium.
It follows that if parties are ex ante identical, then this unique equilibrium is con-
vergent. The proof is provided in the “Appendix”. The Assumption in Proposition 17
can be interpreted as saying that if the population is not too concentrated around the
line y = 0, then the equilibrium is unique. On the other hand, Proposition 13 shows
that, if b is small enough, then there are divergent equilibria, even if parties are ex
6 Note that we parametrize fb by the endpoints of B = [−b, b].
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ante identical. The following example illustrates exactly this situation. As |y2 − y1|
increases, the proposals of the parties converge to a unique equilibrium, which then
becomes stable.
Example 18 Let A = [0, 1], B = [−b, b]. We assume that agents are uniformly
distributed on A× B and parties aggregate the preferences of their members using the
mean voter rule. As before, we let
y1 = −u
2
, y2 = u
2
We claim that for u > 1/2b, there is a unique convergent equilibrium. Let x =
(x1, x2). Recall that
z(t; x) = 2t (x2 − x1) + x
2
1 − x22 + y21 − y22
2(y1 − y2) =
(x1 − x2)(2t − x1 − x2)
2u
After some straightforward computations, we get that
gi (t; x) =
2t xi − 2t x j + u − x2i + x2j
2u
, i, j = 1, 2, i = j
In the following computations, we assume that u is large enough so that the graph of
the line z(t; x) does not intersect the lines y = ±b, for t, x1, x2 ∈ [0, 1]. Since
z(0; x) = x
2
2 − x21
2u
, z(1; x) = (x2 − x1)(x1 + x2 − 2)
2u
this can guaranteed as long as u > 1/2b. Under this assumption, we obtain that7
φ1(x) = 1
6
(
3 − x2 − x1
2bu − (x1 − x2)(x1 + x2 − 1)
)
,
φ2(x) = 1
6
(
3 + x2 − x1
2bu + (x1 − x2)(x1 + x2 − 1)
)
The equilibria, being the fixed points ofφ, are determined by the equations xi = φi (x),
i = 1, 2. A straightforward computation shows that these equations are equivalent to
the following system of equations
0 = 6bu(1 − 2x1) − (x2 − x1) (4 − 3x2 + 3x1(2x1 + 2x2 − 3))
0 = 6bu(1 − 2x2) + (x2 − x1)
(
4 − 9x2 + 6x22 + 3x1(2x2 − 1)
)
7 The expressions of φ1, φ2 are much more complicated for values of t, x1, x2 ∈ [0, 1] for which the graph
of z(t; x) intersects the lines y = ±b.
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Fig. 2 The divergent equilibrium with x1 < x2. Mean voter rule
Adding and subtracting the above two equations, we obtain the following system of
equations
0 = (x1 + x2 − 1)
(
(x1 − x2)2 − 2bu
)
0 = (x1 − x2)(4 − 6bu + 3x21 − 6x1(1 − x2) − 3x2(2 − x2)
We see that x1 = x2 = 1/2 is a solution. If x1 = x2, then we must have that
u = (x2 − x1)
2
2b
So, for 0 ≤ x1, x2 ≤ 1; the function (x2−x1)22b attains the maximum value 1/2b at the
points x1 = 0, x2 = 1 and x1 = 1, x2 = 0. Thus, for u > 1/2b, the unique solution
is x1 = x2 = 1/2.
We can illustrate this numerically. Let A = B = [0, 1] and let the population
distribution be uniform on [0, 1] × [0, 1], so that f (α, β) = 1 for α, β ∈ [0, 1] and
f (α, β) = 0 otherwise. We focus on the equilibrium8 with x1 < x2. We fix y1 = 0.2
and take values of y2 running from 0.21 to 0.8 in steps of 0.01.
Figure 2 shows how the divergent equilibrium is such that the difference between
the two policies, |x∗2 − x∗1 |, is decreasing as |y2 − y1| increases. The ordinate shows
the different values of y1 and the abscissas the corresponding values of |x∗2 − x∗1 |. We
see that there is a negative relation between the value of y2 (which increases the value
of the difference |y2 − y1|) and the difference |x∗2 − x∗1 |.
4 The median voter rule
It is possible to use the same techniques that we used for the median voter rule to
establish similar bounds for other rules. Suppose n = 1 (so that X = [x0, x1] is a
8 Of course, there is a corresponding symmetric equilibrium with x1 > x2.
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compact interval) and parties use the median9 voter rule. That is, for each μ ∈ Σ the
mapping Pm assigns Pm(μ) defined implicitly by the following equation.
μ
({
α ∈ A : α ≤ Pm(μ)}) = μ(A)
2
We assume now that parties use the aggregation rule Pm1 = Pm2 = Pm . As before,
we define φ : X × X → X × X by φ = (φ1, φ2), with φi = Pm ◦σi , i = 1, 2. Clearly,
the equilibria of this model are the fixed points of the mapping φ, given implicitly by
the equations
∫ φ j (x)
x0
g j (α; x) dα = 1
2
∫ x1
x0
g j (α; x) dα, j = 1, 2 (9)
The following result is proved in the “Appendix”.
Lemma 19 The map φ : X × X → X × X is continuous and differentiable.
For a given a distribution f : A× B → R of the population we denote bym j (x) =
Pmj (σ1(x)) the median of the distribution σ j (x) for j = 1, 2. Recall that, when parties
make the same proposal x = (x1, x2)with x1 = x2, we have that σ1(x) and σ2(x) (and
hence m1 = m1(x) and m2 = m2(x)) are independent of x . There is a convergent
equilibrium iff m1(x) = m2(x) for x = (x1, x2) such that x1 = x2. However, as
remarked for the average rule, there is no reason why we should expect thatm1 = m2,
even if it happens that parties aggregate the preferences of their members using the
same decision rule P1 = P2. As with the average aggregation rule, we are interested in
showing that whenever y1 and y2 are close enough and it happens that m1 = m2 = m
(forwhatever reasons), the convergent equilibrium (m,m) is unstable. So, let us assume
that (m,m) is a convergent equilibrium. That is
∫
{α∈A:α≤m}
g j (α) dα = λ j
2
j = 1, 2
with λ1, λ2 defined in (5). As before, wewill establish conditions under which inequal-
ity (7) holds when we use the maps φ1, φ2 defined in (9). Let
f1(m) =
∫ y1+y2
2
x0
f (m, β) dβ
The following result is proved in the “Appendix”.
9 Ansolabehere et al. (2012) assume that parties represent the median of their elected officials.
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Proposition 20 Let n = 1. Suppose that parties use the median voter rule and that
m1 = m2 = m. If
1
f1(m)
(∫ x1
x0
(α − m) f
(
α,
y1 + y2
2
)
dα
−2
∫ m
x0
(α − m) f
(
α,
y1 + y2
2
)
dα
)
> |y2 − y1| > 0 (10)
then there exists a divergent equilibrium.
As a consequence, we have the following.
Corollary 21 Let n = 1. Suppose the parties are ex ante identical, use the median
voter rule and the bound (20) holds. Then, there exists a divergent equilibrium.
It should be noted that when the density of citizens’ ideological viewpoints at the
median point of the whole distribution is f1(m) = 0, then the bound on |y2 − y1|
explodes, as minor changes of policies cause the intra-party medians to move at an
infinite rate.10
Example 22 Take again n = 1 and the population distribution be uniform on [0, 1] ×
[0, 1] so that f (α, β) = 1 and λ1 = λ2 = 1/2. Suppose that both parties use the
median voter rule Pm . In this case, the bound for |y2 − y1| implied by Proposition 20
is easily computed to be equal to 1/2. That is, as long as 0 < |y2 − y1| < 1/2 there
exists a divergent equilibrium.
We see that, with the uniform distribution of citizens over A× B = [0, 1]× [0, 1],
the bound for |y2 − y1| implied by the median voter rule is weaker than that for
the mean voter rule (for which it is 13 ). Therefore, as the policy difference between
parties induces ideologically skewed memberships within each party, the medians
move toward the edges faster than the means.
As an example satisfying this inequality take y1 = 0.55 and y2 = 0.20. It is not
difficult to show that the unique divergent equilibrium has x1 = 0.389972, x2 =
0.717886.
It is straightforward to prove the analogue of Proposition 16 for the median voter
rule. The statement of the result is exactly the same except, of course, that one assumes
now that parties use the median voter rule. We leave the details to the interested reader.
Likewise, one might obtain similar results to those in Propositions 13 and 20 that
guarantee the existence of divergent equilibria when parties use distinct rules. Of
course, the result is trivially true if there is no convergent equilibrium. For example, if
party 1 uses the mean voter rule, while party 2 uses the median voter rule a convergent
equilibrium only exists if the mean equals the median for the overall population distri-
bution f1(α), i.e., ifm = μ. However, even for the case whenm = μwe can guarantee
10 Though, strictly speaking, the function φ is not differentiable (not even necessarily continuous) in this
case, the instability of the convergent equilibrium and the consequent existence of a divergent equilibrium
can be easily shown using standard approximation techniques.
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existence of a divergent equilibria for |y2 − y1| small enough. In fact, using inequal-
ity 7, we can establish that such equilibria exist in this case whenever the following
condition holds.
0 < |y2 − y1| < 1
λ1
∫
A
(α − μ)2 f
(
α,
y1 + y2
2
)
dα
+ 1
1 − λ1
1
f1(μ)
∫
{α:α≤μ}
(μ − α) f
(
α,
y1 + y2
2
)
dα
4.1 Policy divergence and non-ideological characteristics for the median voter
rule
In this section, we consider again the convergence/divergence of the equilibria as
y2 − y1 varies. We will show that the analogue of Example 18 holds also when parties
aggregate the preferences of their members via the median voter rule.
Example 23 Let A = [0, 1], B = [−b, b] and assume that agents are uniformly
distributed on A× B and parties aggregate the preferences of their members using the
median voter rule. As in Example 18, we let
y1 = −u
2
, y2 = u
2
Recall that
z(t; x) = (x1 − x2)(2t − x1 − x2)
2u
and
g1(t; x) = 2t x1 − 2t x2 + u − x
2
1 + x22
2u
g2(t; x) = 2t x2 − 2t x1 + u + x
2
1 − x22
2u
We assume again that u ≥ 1/2b so that the graph of z(t; x) does not intersect the lines
y = ±b. The expressions of φ1, φ2 are fairly cumbersome and we skip them here. We
remark though that one can check that the solutions to φi (x1, x2) = xi , i = 1, 2 are(
x∗1 , x∗2
) = (1 − √1 − bu, 1 + √1 − bu), (x∗1 , x∗2
) = (1 + √1 − bu, 1 − √1 − bu)
and
(
x∗1 , x∗2
) = ( 12 , 12
)
. Of course, the first two equilibria are only valid if bu ≤ 1,
1 − √1 − bu ≥ −b and 1 + √1 − bu ≤ b. Thus, for b fixed the only equilibrium is
the convergent one, as long as bu > 1.
Figure 3 graphs numerically the fixed points corresponding to the idiosyncratic
issues. In there, we take A = B = [0, 1] and the population is distributed uniformly
on [0, 1] × [0, 1]. We fix y1 = 0.2 and take values of y2 running from 0.21 to 0.8 in
steps of 0.01, so y2 − y1 varies from 0.01 to 0.5. The graph plots the values of the
equilibria (abcissas) versus the values of y2 − y1 (ordinates). The blue and red lines
represent the values of the equilibria, x1 (red) and x2 (blue).
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Fig. 3 The unique divergent equilibrium with x1 < x2. Median Voter Rule
The intuition is the same as for the mean rule. If the non-ideological characteristics
y1 and y2 are very different, the memberships of parties are basically determined by
such characteristics.
In this case, and given that the distributions of α and β are independent, both
parties will have similar mean and median values of α. Examples 15 and 22 provide
an extreme case of this type of situation where the equilibrium policy characteristics
of both parties coincide.
5 Conclusions and further research
In this paper, we have introduced a model in which the citizens’ party choice is
determined by both the ideological difference between the parties and the unobserved
non-ideological attitudes. As the membership choice is only incompletely determined
by the observed policy proposals, it may be interpreted as stochastic from the point
of view of the parties. The party membership, in turn, determines party policy stances
by means of intra-party preference aggregation rules.
We have especially focused on the important cases in which parties aggregate pref-
erences by choosing ideal points of their mean or median voters. Parties are perceived
by citizens as ‘similar’ in the sense that the non-policy difference is small compared to
the mean of the agents’ preferences in the ideological space. In this context and with
two parties we show that we are guaranteed existence of divergent equilibria, even in
an ex ante symmetric model. In this sense, the present stochastic model shows conti-
nuity with the deterministic endogenous platform model studied earlier in Gomberg
et al. (2004).
It should be noted that a similar stochastic preference model has been previously
considered in Caplin and Nalebuff (1997). However, the authors of that paper believed
that approach was, in a certain sense, simply imposing policy divergence exogenously,
rather than having it emerge endogenously in the model. In fact, they were worried
that as the stochastic preference component would become smaller, equilibrium policy
divergence would itself disappear. This observation, in fact, motivated their ‘index
theory’ approach, which we have also utilized since. What we show in this paper,
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however, is that, under the assumptions of the model, properly divergent equilibria are
guaranteed to exist even as the stochastic preference component becomes weaker.
The model provides what we believe are original insights pertaining to the level
of party polarization11. Under certain conditions on the distribution of preferences, if
parties are very different in their non-policy characteristics, their policy proposals will
be very similar.
It remains to consider how the results extend to increasing the number of parties,
as well as considering different party decision-making rules.
6 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 5 We will show that the mappings σ1, σ2 : X × X → Σ are Fréchet
differentiable (which, of course, implies continuity). We do the proof for i = 1. Let
x = (x1, x2) ∈ X × X . Note that
∂g1
∂x1
= f (α, z(α; x)) α − x1
y2 − y1
and
∂g1
∂x2
= f (α, z(α; x)) x2 − α
y2 − y1
From the above expressions, the Fréchet derivative can be easily computed. We use
the notation e = (h, k) and ‖e‖ = √h2 + k2. Fix x ∈ X × X . A simple computation
shows that
z(α; x + e) − z(α; x) = h(α − x1) + k(x2 − α) − (k
2 − h2)/2
y2 − y1
= (h − k)α − x1h + x2k
y2 − y1 +
h2 − k2
2(y2 − y1)
Note that there is M > 0 such that
|z(α; x + e) − z(α; x)|
‖e‖ ≤ M
for any α ∈ A and e such that ‖e‖ ≤ 1. Let ε > 0. Note that
g1(α; x + e) − g1(α; (x)) =
∫ z(α;x+e)
z(α;x)
f (α, β) dβ
We are ready now to compute Dσ(e; x) : R2 → C(A), the derivative of σ at the point
x . We continue to use the notation e = (h, k). We will show that Dσ(e; x)(α) takes
the following value
11 See Fauli-Oller et al. (2003) for a different view on party polarization.
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Dσ(e; x)(α) = f (α, z(α; x)
y2 − y1 (h(α − x1) + k(x2 − α))
=
∫ z(α;x+e)
z(α;x)
f (α, z(α; x)) dβ − k
2 − h2
2|y2 − y1|
Note that Dσ(e; x)(α), as defined in the above equation, is linear in e and continuous
in all the variables. Note that,
g1(α; x + e) − g1(α; x) − Dσ(e; x)(α)
=
∫ z(α;x+e)
z(α;x)
( f (α, β) − f (α, z(α; x))) dβ + k
2 − h2
2|y2 − y1|
Since z is continuous and f (α, β) is uniformly continuous in A×[z(α; x), z(α; x+e)],
given ε > 0, there is a 0 < δ < 1 such that if ‖e‖ ≤ δ, then
| f (α, β) − f (α, z(α; x))| ≤ ε
M
Thus, as long as ‖e‖ ≤ δ we have that
|g1(α; x+e)−g1(α; (x)) − Dσ(e; x)(α)|≤ ε
M
|z(α; x + e) − z(α; x)|+ k
2 + h2
2|y2 − y1|
So, for any α ∈ A, the following holds
|g1(α; x + e) − g1(α; (x)) − Dσ(e; x)(α)|
‖e‖ ≤ ε +
k2 + h2
2‖e‖ = ε +
‖e‖
2|y2 − y1|
Hence, we have that
sup
α∈A
|g1(α; x + e) − g1(α; (x)) − Dσ(e; x)(α)|
‖e‖ ≤ ε +
‖e‖
2|y2 − y1|
Therefore,
‖g1(α; x + e) − g1(·; x) − Dσ(e; x)‖
‖e‖ ≤ ε +
‖e‖
2|y2 − y1|
Since ε > 0 is arbitrary, we see that
lim‖e‖→0
‖σ1(x + e) − σ1(x) − Dσ(e; x)‖
‖e‖ = 0
and the Lemma is proved.
Proof of Lemma 12 Lemma 12 is consequence of Lemma 5 and of Lemma 24 below.
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Lemma 24 The map Pμ : Σ × Σ → A × A is continuous and differentiable.
Proof of Lemma 24 For each i = 1, 2, the maps νi → νi (A) and νi →
∫
A αd νi (α)
are linear. It is easy to see that they are also continuous. For example, given ε > 0, let
δ = ε∫
A α dα
If sup{| f (α) − g(α)| : α ∈ A} ≤ δ then
∣
∣
∣
∣
∫
A
α f (α) dα −
∫
A
αg(α) dα
∣
∣
∣
∣ ≤
∫
A
α| f (α) − g(α)| dα ≤ δ
∫
A
α dα = ε
So νi →
∫
A αdνi (α) is continuous. The proof that νi → νi (A) is continuous is similar.
Hence, it follows that the maps νi → νi (A) and νi →
∫
A αdνi (α) are differentiable.
Since for every i = 1, 2 we have that νi (A) = 0, the mapping νi →
∫
A αd νi (α)
νi (A)
is also
differentiable. Therefore, so is Pμ.
For the proof of Proposition 13, we will make use of the following result.
Lemma 25
lim
x→(μ,μ)
∂φ j
∂xi
(x) = 1
λ j
∫
A
(α − μ)∂g j (α; (μ,μ)
∂xi
dα
Proof of Lemma 25 Note that
∂φ j
∂xi
(x) = 1
(
∫
A g j (α; x) dα)2
(∫
A
α
∂g j
∂xi
(α; (μ,μ) dα
∫
A
g j (α; x) dα
−
∫
A
αg j (α; x) dα
∫
A
∂g j
∂xi
(α; (μ,μ) dα
)
= 1
(
∫
A g j (α; x)dα)
∫
A
(
α − φ j (x)
) ∂g j
∂xi
(α; (μ,μ) dα
Thus,
lim
x→(μ,μ)
∂φ j
∂xi
(x) = 1
λ j
∫
A
(α − μ)∂g j
∂xi
(α; (μ,μ) dα
and the Lemma follows.
Proof of Proposition 13 Recall that, given the proposals x = (x1, x2) of the parties,
we use the notation
g j (α; x) =
∫
{(α,β):||(x j ,y j )−(α,β)||≥||(xi ,yi )−(α,β)||,i = j}
f (α, β)dβ
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when we want to make explicit the dependence of the density functions that describe
the induced population partitions on the policies proposed by the parties. We have
seen in the proof of Lemma 5 that
∂g1(α; x)
∂x1
= f (α, z(α; x))∂1z(t; x)|t=α = f (α, z(α; x))
α − x1
y2 − y1
Furthermore,
∂g1(α; x)
∂x2
= f (α, z(α; x))∂2z(t; x)|t=α = f (α, z(α; x))
x2 − α
y2 − y1 (11)
which implies that
∂g1
∂x1
(α; (μ,μ)) = −∂g1
∂x2
(α; (μ,μ)) = f
(
α,
y1 + y2
2
)
α − μ
y2 − y1
Since for party 2 the relevant population density is
g2(α; x) =
∫ ∞
z(α;x)
f (α, β) dβ
we get that
∂g2
∂x2
(α; (μ,μ)) = −∂g2
∂x1
(α; (μ,μ)) = ∂g1
∂x1
(α; (μ,μ)) (12)
= f
(
α,
y1 + y2
2
)
α − μ
y2 − y1
To ease the notation, we will write gi = gi (α; (μ,μ)). Applying Lemma 25 and
using the above formulae for
∂g j
∂xi
, we have to establish conditions under which
lim
x→(μ,μ) |B(x)| =
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
1
λ1
∫
A(α − μ)∂g1∂x1 dα − 1 1λ1
∫
A(α − μ)∂g1∂x2 dα − 1
1
λ2
∫
A(α − μ)∂g2∂x1 dα − 1 1λ2
∫
A(α − μ)∂g2∂x2 dα − 1
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
=
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
1
λ1
∫
A(α − μ)∂g1∂x1 dα − 1 1λ1
∫
A(α − μ)∂g1∂x1 dα − 1
1
λ2
∫
A(α − μ)∂g1∂x1 dα − 1 1λ2
∫
A(α − μ)∂g1∂x1 dα − 1
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
= 1 − 1
λ1λ2
∫
A
(α − μ)∂g1
∂x1
dα
= 1 − 1
λ1λ2 (y2 − y1)
∫
A
(α − μ)2 f
(
α,
y1 + y2
2
)
dα < 0
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which clearly holds if
|y2 − y1| < 1
λ1λ2
∫
A
(α − μ)2 f
(
α,
y1 + y2
2
)
dα
The Proposition follows from the above inequality.
Proof of Proposition 16 Fix a pair of x1 = x2 and for any s ∈ [0, 1] define ys1 =
y1 + t (y2 − y1). Note that as s → 0 the induced partition hyperplane will converge
to perfect sorting in the policy dimension, as in Remark 1. This, of course, implies
that the induced population partitions for gs1(α; x), gs2(α; x) converge uniformly to
those given in Remark 1. Hence, for any x /∈  the induced measures σ s1 (x), σ s2 (x)
will converge uniformly in L1 as s → 0 to the measures obtained in Remark 1. (Note
that this convergence is not uniform for x ∈ X × X , as, in fact, the functions will
not converge on the diagonal.) It follows that the stable fixed points of φs converge to
some stable fixed points of the limiting model.
Now, in the proof of Proposition 13 we have seen that
|Bs(μ,μ)| = 1 − 1
λ1λ2
(
ys2 − y21
)
∫
A
(α − μ)2 f
(
α,
ys1 + ys2
2
)
dα
= 1 − 1
s
(
1
2λ1λ2 (y2 − y1)
∫
A
(α − μ)2 f (α, y1 + y2) dα
)
The term inside the brackets does not depend on s. Hence, there is a ε > 0 such that
|Bs(μ,μ)| < 0 for any x ∈ X × X and 0 < s < ε. It follows that the stable fixed
points of φs cannot converge to the diagonal.
Proof of Proposition 17 Since yu1 = − u2 , yu2 = u2 , we have that
yu1+yu2
2 = 0. To make
explicit the dependence on u, we will write z(t; x; u) = z(t; x) = (x1−x2)(2t−x1−x2)2u ,
φ j (x; u) = φ j (x) and let gi (α; x; u) = gi (α; x), i = 1, 2, defined by (3) with f
replaced by fb. Note that
|z(t; x; u)| ≤ 1
u
for every x = (x1, x2) ∈ A × A, t ∈ A. Hence, limu→+∞ z(t; x; u) = 0 and
lim
u→∞
∫
A
gi (α; x; u) dα = λi > 0, i = 1, 2
uniformly on x ∈ A × A. That is, there is a real number b1 > 0 such that if u ≥ b1,
then ∫
A
gi (α; x; u) dα ≥ λi
2
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for every x ∈ X × X . Let M be the supremum of f0 on the set A × [−∞,∞]. From
the proof of Lemma 24, we see that
∣
∣
∣
∣
∂g j (α; x; u)
∂xi
∣
∣
∣
∣ = f (α, z(α; x))
|α − xi |
|y2 − y1| = f (α, z(α; x))
|α − xi |
u
≤ M |α − xi |
u
And, since α, φ j (x; u) and xi belong to A = [0, 1] we have that |α − φ j (x; u)| ≤ 1
and |α − xi | ≤ 1. Hence,
∣
∣
∣
∣
∂φ j (x; u)
∂xi
∣
∣
∣
∣ ≤
1
(
∫
A g j (α; x)dα)
∫
A
∣
∣α − φ j (x)
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∂g j (α; x; u)
∂xi
∣
∣
∣
∣ dα ≤
M
uλ j
for every x ∈ X × X and u > b1. It follows that there is b¯ ≥ b1 such that
∣
∣
∣
∂φ j (x;u)
∂xi
∣
∣
∣ <
1/4 for every u ≥ b¯ and for every x ∈ X × X .
Let b ≥ u ≥ b¯. The proof of Lemma 24 shows that det(B(x)) = 1 +
∂1φ1(x; u)∂2φ2(x; u) − ∂1φ2(x; u)∂2φ2(x; u) − ∂1φ2(x; u) − ∂2φ2(x; u) > 0. Since
the sum of the indices of the fixed points must add to the Euler Characteristics of the
rectangle A × B, which is +1, there can be at most a fixed point.
Proof of Lemma 19 Let j = 1, 2 and consider the function Fj : X × X × X → R
defined by
F(x1, x2, y) =
∫ y
−∞
g j (α; x) dα
Since f (α, β) is equivalent to Lebesgue measure, for each x = (x1, x2) ∈ X × X , the
equation
F(x1, x2, y) = λ j
2
has a unique solution y = φ j (x) in the interior of X . And since
∂F
∂y
= g j (y; x) > 0
we may apply the implicit function theorem to conclude that there is an open neigh-
borhood U of x in X × X , an open neighborhood V of y in X and a continuously
differentiable function φ j : U → V such that
F(x1, x2, φ j (x)) = λ j
2
Hence, the function φ = (φ1, φ2) : V × V → X is continuously differentiable.
Proof of Proposition 20 Differentiating φ implicitly with respect to xi in Equation
(9), we obtain
g j (φ j (x); x)∂φ j
∂xi
(x) +
∫ φ j (x j )
−∞
∂g j (α; x)
∂xi
dα = 1
2
∫ ∞
−∞
∂g j (α; x)
∂xi
dα
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Taking the limit of the expression as x → (m,m), we obtain
f1(m)
∂φ j
∂xi
(m) +
∫ m
−∞
∂g j
∂xi
(α;m) dα = 1
2
∫ ∞
−∞
∂g j
∂xi
(α;m) dα (13)
with
f1(m) =
∫ y1+y2
2
−∞
f (m, β) dβ
Now, taking into account Eqs. (11) and (12) the formulas for
∂g j (α;x)
∂xi
, we see that
∂φ1
∂x1
(m) = ∂φ2
∂x2
(m) = −∂φ2
∂x1
(m) = −∂φ1
∂x2
(m)
Thus, the determinant in (7) becomes,
B(x) =
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∂φ1
∂x1
(m) − 1 ∂φ1
∂x2
(m)
∂φ2
∂x1
(m) ∂φ2
∂x2
(m) − 1
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
=
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∂φ1
∂x1
(m) − 1 − ∂φ1
∂x1
(m)
− ∂φ1
∂x1
(m) ∂φ1
∂x1
(m) − 1
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
= 1−2∂φ1
∂x1
(m)
Finally, from equations (13), (11) and (12) we get that
∂φ1
∂x1
(x) = 1
(y2 − y1) f1(m)
(
1
2
∫ ∞
−∞
(α − m) f
(
α,
y1 + y2
2
)
dα
−
∫ m
−∞
(α − m) f
(
α,
y1 + y2
2
)
dα
)
.
And the proposition follows.
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